Thursday, March 11, 2021< ^ >
sftcd-pidgin has set the subject to: OpenPGP Interim - 20210226
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[14:22:29] dkg has set the subject to: OpenPGP @ IETF 110
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[14:23:20] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> I can hear
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[14:23:41] <Justus Winter_web_311> :/
[14:23:43] <Justus Winter_web_311> i'm not
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[14:25:18] <Justus Winter_web_645> nooo
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[14:25:49] <dkg> on the plus side, it'll make the presentation go really fast if there's no audio :P
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[14:26:58] <sftcd> hi we're still looking for a note taker (and won't start'till we get one) - any volunteers?
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[14:27:42] <dkg> note-taking happens here:
[14:27:55] <sftcd> it's very easy:-)
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[14:28:06] <Yoav Nir_web_637> I guess I can do it
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[14:28:46] <sftcd> thanks Yoav!
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[14:31:44] <Paul Wouters_web_611> I am talking today? :)
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[14:32:00] <sftcd> a bit:-)
[14:32:07] <Paul Wouters_web_611> ok :)
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[14:34:00] <Yoav Nir_web_637> I haven't followed this group in the past. It's weird that in 2021 we have a "crypto refresh" draft with a list of algorithms (at least the symmetric ones) that looks like IPsec in 2000.
[14:34:22] <> Don't look at what they're replacing, then :)
[14:34:24] <sftcd> life's weird:-) it'll get more modern
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[14:34:43] <Yoav Nir_web_637> TripleDES is MUST
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[14:35:32] <Paul Wouters_web_611> rfcdiff is your friend to compare those 3 documents
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[14:36:38] <Paul Wouters_web_611> yoav: perhaps in the future we can do the same as dnssec. make a difference between verifying/derypting and encrypting/signing algorithms
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[14:39:09] <> This talk makes me feel better about how we always passed around the
krbcore-security keys in unicast pgp-encrypted mail and did not rely
on just the passphrase on the key
[14:39:50] <dkg> belt *and* suspenders ++
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[14:46:09] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> I can see the attack on RSA, but Ed448 keys are inputs to a hash from which a private key is derived...
[14:46:16] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> What am I missing?
[14:46:30] <Robin Wilton_web_187> Does anyone here remember IBM's "control vectors" for symmetric keys?
[14:46:54] <dkg> Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501: the private keys are not tampered with in this attack
[14:47:02] <dkg> the public keys are tampered with
[14:47:05] <> How does the "expensive to validate" compare to the initial effort for
key generation?
[14:47:28] <Kenny Paterson_web_559> Significantly higher.
[14:47:36] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> @dkg, ah... I don't store those in my key format.
[14:47:52] <dkg> Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501: how do you get them?
[14:48:08] <Kenny Paterson_web_559> You have to check there's no elements of small order, for some definition of small tuned to your security bound. Nasty.
[14:48:37] <dkg> Kenny Paterson_web_559: so if the private key is maintained, could you just derive the pubkey from the secret key and ignore the pubkey found on disk instead?
[14:49:07] <Kenny Paterson_web_559> Depends,it's scheme-specific.
[14:49:54] <> Thanks Kenny!
[14:51:09] <Kenny Paterson_web_559> To expand on Lara's answer: we did responsible disclosure.
[14:51:47] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> @dkg, I use a KDF to derive the seeds for the signature, encryption and authentication keys from the device seed. Then threshold combine them with the keys generated from the activation record from the admin device. Then check the fingerprints match those in the connection record.
[14:52:08] <Paul Wouters_web_611> more volume would be nice
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[14:52:32] <Paul Wouters_web_611> yes
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[14:55:07] <Robin Wilton_web_187> Thanks Lara - excellent work, really clearly explained!
[14:55:58] <Kenny Paterson_web_656> @dkg: you can recover public key from private key in the case of RSA, but not for ElGamal, etc, where there are "more parameters" than are determined by the private key alone, e.g. generator for group, prime p, etc.
[14:56:11] <dkg> Kenny Paterson_web_656: makes sense, thanks.
[14:56:33] <dkg> EdDSA and Ed448 seem like you could also do the derivation
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[14:57:10] <dkg> (though i wonder about changing the public identification of which algo the key actually is)
[14:57:16] <Stavros Kousidis_web_162> Can you recover e in RSA just from p,q,d? There are a lot of e's possible.
[14:57:39] <sftcd> e=65537 is a good guess:-)
[14:57:41] <Paul Wouters_web_611> isnt e usually 3 or 65535 ?
[14:57:47] <Paul Wouters_web_611> yeah that one :)
[14:57:55] <Stavros Kousidis_web_162> that's a choice, is it always fixed to this?
[14:58:11] <Lara Bruseghini_web_776> you can recover e uniquely with those parameters, yes
[14:58:30] <Kenny Paterson_web_656> Yes, for RSA you can reconstruct pub_key from priv_key. But we think an algorithm-agnostic approach to fixing the issues is better.
[14:58:41] <Stavros Kousidis_web_162> of course
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[14:59:44] <Kenny Paterson_web_656> @stavros, given d, p, q, e is uniquely determined as the solution to the equation de =1 mod (p-1)(q-1); the only exception is when d is not coprime to p-1 or q-1, but such keys are not valid RSA private keys anyway.
[15:00:00] <dkg> for the record, dkgpg is not my implementation -- it's "distributed key gnu privacy guard"
[15:00:10] <Kenny Paterson_web_656> Sorry, given d, p, q, the value of e is uniquely determined, etc.
[15:00:15] <Paul Wouters_web_611> i was wondering why you made your own :)
[15:00:24] <> dkg: oops, I definitely made that assumption
[15:00:28] <dkg> and named it after myself?  i'm no linus :P
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[15:00:46] <sftcd> worked for CBOR:-)
[15:01:49] <Robin Wilton_web_187> lol
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[15:03:13] <Tadahiko Ito_web_247> some implementation store only d and n as private key, some implementation store d, p, q, n.  I am wondering which would be better practice.
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[15:05:02] <Yoav Nir_web_637> Since you don't need p and q once you've generated d and n, it's better not to store them.  But that's just hygiene. If d leaks, it's as bad as p and q leaking.
[15:05:24] <Kenny Paterson_web_656> Indeed. And keeping p, q around allows you to use CRT tricks to speed up decryption/signing.
[15:05:34] <sftcd> Don't most store CRT values too?
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[15:06:23] <Yoav Nir_web_637> I think they're generated in memory rather than stored.
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[15:06:48] <Yoav Nir_web_637> (at least, that's what we did)
[15:08:25] <sftcd> if people have questions/comments jump in the line now
[15:09:58] <sftcd> thanks justus - good work!
[15:10:07] <dkg> Justus Winter_web_173: thank you!  this is a huge ongoing contribution
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[15:18:23] <> I've become pretty convinced that (in general, going forward) when
representing keys we should just have a declared key length (possibly
determined by the algorithm, possibly variable) and otherwise treat
the key as a blob of the corresponding length, and not expose any
internal encoding of the blob in how we interact with the key outside
the actual cryptographic algorithm implementation.
[15:18:51] <sftcd> +1 (based on recent openssl experience:-)
[15:19:51] <> sftcd: so you're signing up to convince NIST to take this path? ;)
[15:20:29] <sftcd> me and "convince NIST" aren't things often in proximity
[15:20:49] <dkg> i agree, and that's *almost* what gniibe is proposing here
[15:21:06] <> Agreed
[15:21:22] <dkg> gniibe's slides offer an explanation of why he's not going quite that far, though (in the "alternatives" section at the end)
[15:21:24] <> The last (?) slide [of the deck] has a pretty good summary of the
[15:21:58] <ángel> +1
[15:22:00] <ángel> I think there should always be an key length value, so that an implementation not supporting it could treat that as an opaque blob, although some algorithms MUST reject any key not of their fixed length
[15:23:37] <> (note: not the last slide of the deck, now that I check)
[15:24:34] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501>
[15:24:42] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> A different way to do this
[15:24:54] <> Alternative 3 ("just an octet string") with new codepoints for
EdDSA-JOS and ECDH-JOS is pretty appealing in the abstract, but I
don't have a great sense for how much of a legacy headache the
existing implementations will be and how long of a tail we will have.
Though, I suspect we basically would not be able to actually get rid
of the existing stuff...
[15:25:21] <dkg> yeah, i don't think you could get rid of the legacy stuff, and it'd just be duplicative work :(
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[15:27:40] <> UDF seems like a nice thing you can use for new stuff, but has no
possibility of backwards compatibility with existing openpgp stuff
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[15:28:55] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> @kaduk, that depends on how you are managing your OpenPGP keys:-)
[15:29:06] <sftcd> last topic we wanna touch on is how-many-interims so consider that if you'd take part
[15:29:28] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> @kaduk, if you are using the Mesh to manage your private keys across devices, this is just how the Mesh app is pushing private keys into the OpenPGP app
[15:29:41] <> Phill: agreed
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[15:30:36] <Phillip Hallam-Baker_web_501> @kaduk, if your application wants to use per device keys that are threshold bound to the device, the Mesh is currently how you would do it
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[15:31:32] <ángel> see you!
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[15:31:41] <sftcd> thanks all
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[15:32:08] <gniibe> Thank you all.  Thanks to dkg for slides and many help.
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[15:33:02] <sftcd> and thanks Yoav for notes
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