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[19:21:01] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Hello there, testing :)
[19:28:36] <Eric Vyncke> Loud and clear Adam
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[19:44:22] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Excellent, I think we are ready. I hope webex works on this linux box through Firefox
[19:45:23] <Bob Moskowitz> When I click on DRIP agenda on https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/107/agenda.html, no link to Stu's slides.
[19:45:54] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> His slides are drip arch and req files
[19:46:23] <Bob Moskowitz> Ah, the Etherpad has the links.
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[19:59:42] <keithmoore> are people talking?  all I've heard so far is a cough.
[20:00:08] <Eric Vyncke> My cough (sorry)
[20:00:27] <Eric Vyncke> Not the best sound check ;-) but you do not want to listen to me singing...
[20:00:30] <keithmoore> hope you coughed into your elbow :)   anyway, glad to know the audio is working.
[20:00:42] mcr joins the room
[20:00:57] <mcr> The DRIP meeting has disappeared from the IETF virtual interim calendar.
[20:00:57] johnk joins the room
[20:01:01] <Eric Vyncke> Sure ;-)
[20:01:01] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Adam: When Coronovirus can pass through computers, that is the day I give up hope
[20:01:20] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Not even transcending into the digital realm will save us
[20:01:31] <mcr> Sorry, I mean to say that there are no details on connecting in the calendar, and your agenda has no URLs in it.
[20:01:35] <Eric Vyncke> @Mcr I see it https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/agenda/
[20:01:39] <keithmoore> Adam W/ Stu C: I'm sure there are people working on it now.  combine coronavirus with ransomware.
[20:02:10] jhoyla joins the room
[20:02:13] <mcr> Eric, I will look again. Oh, I had some filters applied using the tm-rid name. Dumb.
[20:02:26] <mcr> But, the agenda posted had no links in it.
[20:02:31] Karen O'Donoghue joins the room
[20:03:44] cabo joins the room
[20:03:59] <mcr> Daniel is 200km away from me, but in Montreal, it's "morning".
[20:04:10] Carsten Bormann joins the room
[20:04:16] tim costello joins the room
[20:04:18] cabo leaves the room
[20:04:21] <Eric Vyncke> ;-)
[20:04:41] dee3@jabb.im joins the room
[20:05:08] whatdafuq joins the room
[20:05:29] stewart@jabber.today joins the room
[20:05:34] SHollenbeck joins the room
[20:05:58] <mcr> if you can't connect to etherpad on port 9009, you can use it on port 443.
[20:06:01] <mcr> but, that might break.
[20:06:34] york@jabber.isoc.org joins the room
[20:06:35] <Eric Vyncke> Thank you Michael indeed
[20:06:38] ek joins the room
[20:07:45] <Carsten Bormann> Daniel, please switch to full screen and move with page up/page down.
[20:07:59] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Yes please!
[20:09:10] Carsten Bormann leaves the room
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[20:10:40] <mcr> (please don't use github if you aren't confident using it, because someone who sends you a pull request which is then lost is rather discouraged. I am happy to tutor, provided you have a real shell)
[20:11:08] rickwilhelm-Verisign joins the room
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[20:11:55] <cabo> How do you beat up a prisoner to pay attention to the chats?
[20:12:01] <cabo> Presenter, DYAC
[20:12:16] <mcr> I will interrupt.
[20:12:18] Ben Campbell joins the room
[20:14:04] Jari Arkko joins the room
[20:14:06] <mcr> I am surprised at how good the audio is, given that they are in a conference room.
[20:14:24] <Eric Vyncke> good mike indeed
[20:14:42] <mcr> (can someone who uses Windows please explain how to make this work right)
[20:14:47] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> on my personal machine using computer audio
[20:14:57] <cabo> Daniel fell into the Chrome trap of typing space to scroll — if you just went full screen, that presses the full screen button again.  Designed by idiots.
[20:15:58] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> i will interrupt and have him fix
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[20:16:39] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Better everyone?
[20:16:43] <cabo> Yes
[20:17:31] <jhoyla> Can he not get rid of the browser chrome by hitting F11?
[20:17:40] <cabo> Yes
[20:18:02] <cabo> You can get rid of that by zooming in in Webex
[20:18:16] <keithmoore> As a pilot I certainly understand why it's necessary to track drones and avoid conflicts, but I'm very concerned about IETF being used to help governments do surveillance.
[20:18:53] <Eric Vyncke> privacy is in the charter so it MUST be present in some sort of the other
[20:18:54] <mcr> (read the specs keith please)
[20:18:58] <cabo> (Protip: Always have slide numbers on the slides.  In Keynote, that is a single action.)
[20:19:24] <keithmoore> the devil is in the details, of course.
[20:19:32] <mcr> if the IETF is not involved, we will wind up with a system that is trivially spoofable, in my opinion.
[20:19:37] <stewart@jabber.today> It really is about conflict avoidance and law abidence - In UK we had a close call with the regulator following the gatwick incident
[20:19:47] <Amelia Andersdotter> or with 3gpp identifiers tho?
[20:19:48] <mcr> slide 6, btw.
[20:20:20] <cabo> Yeah, here the browser chrome actually helps...
[20:20:28] Bernie Hoeneisen joins the room
[20:20:47] <ash> WAVE tried so hard to be anonymized and authenticated, and there's no way you could shoehorn all that supporting tech into a UAV
[20:21:14] <stewart@jabber.today> Does anyone know if the system allowa a ground proxy for the case where the drone is lightweight
[20:22:06] <cabo> (Protip: Application sharing or Tab sharing is better then screen sharing.)
[20:22:13] <mcr> cabo, yeah.
[20:22:29] <jhoyla> I think Mac users were having issues with that yesterday
[20:22:31] <mcr> I think that windows can't do that, since the windows people are always broadcasting their entire screen.
[20:22:55] <mcr> and broadcasting a smaller number of pixels means they are bigger.
[20:22:59] <Eric Vyncke> Webex on windows can share one app
[20:23:16] <Amelia Andersdotter> in specifically webex? i got a windows computer at work and it shares single apps for a range of conference tools
[20:23:18] <cabo> Mac users need to allow the Webex browser/app to use screen sharing
[20:23:27] <stewart@jabber.today> So can Mac - I do it all the time and have done for years
[20:23:51] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Can someone guide him on that? I'm not familiar with webex all that well - perhaps as we switch to next presentation?
[20:23:59] <mcr> regular situation where it tries actually just broadcasts the screen, with the parts not part of the application blacked out.
[20:24:08] Alexey Melnikov joins the room
[20:24:10] <Amelia Andersdotter> how depressing that EASA would not allowed a randomly generated alphanumeric code for only one flight
[20:24:45] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Yes Amelia - its a shame cause they only allow Type 1
[20:25:13] <Amelia Andersdotter> that kind of makes type 1 a default and type 3 a nice addition
[20:25:27] <stewart@jabber.today> UK we have to have an ID on the outside of the aircraft anyway
[20:25:53] <mcr> Amelia, Adam, Stu and Bob have been making lots of good connections to regulator in the US, but we haven't found an equivalent European to make that connection yet, I think.  
[20:26:14] <whatdafuq> integrity protected and authenticated lies are still lies
[20:27:14] <Amelia Andersdotter> @mcr, they'll be per member state but i can ask someone actually
[20:27:20] <jhoyla> But you might at least have non-repuditability, which gives you audit capabilities perhaps.
[20:27:25] <ash> OK, so transitioning to larger aircraft, there's the ADS-B system which broadcasts a unique ID per aircraft, right?
[20:27:32] <mcr> @Amelia, I figured you might know someone :-)
[20:28:00] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Yes Ash there is but its unknown at this time how it would transition - its the dream to do so
[20:28:13] <whatdafuq> need to find some european to sue for randomly generated codes in the ECJ on the "right to be forgotten"
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[20:30:52] <mcr> interesting tactic @whatdafuq
[20:32:07] <mcr> Web Authorization is whom?
[20:32:37] <mcr> Hanes? Carsten?
[20:32:46] <Eric Vyncke> I would guess Hannes
[20:32:47] <cabo> Not e
[20:32:49] <cabo> me
[20:32:56] <SHollenbeck> FWIW, there are some WHOIS/RDAP, EPP, DNS people who are watching here and are willing to help.
[20:32:57] <mcr> (would be great if you could logout of webex next time and use your name)
[20:33:13] <Amelia Andersdotter> @mcr "knowing someone" is not an exact science.
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[20:33:21] <cabo> I'm actually logged in and found the secret way to put in my name
[20:33:41] <Amelia Andersdotter> @whatdafuq i think it doesn't help in airlines. it's one of these places where member states hold on to power much. alitalia is nationalized since last week for example.
[20:34:14] <mcr> I didn't really understand the question.
[20:34:51] <mcr> and Joseph is not Web Auth Protocol WG.
[20:36:01] <stewart@jabber.today> It is considered unsafe by some operators to have an active phon on the flightline. There have been some accidents addocieted with phone originating EMI on the transmitter
[20:36:38] <ash> So if we depend on some sort of authenticated beacon for collision avoidance, that would make it super easy to cause havok by flying a hacked UAV that doesn't participate. Maybe just leave collision avoidance to spatial sensors, and where UAV to UAV comms need to happen, establish a trust relationship between participating devices in the swarm. I like the announcement of a flight-ID or session-ID, that can be correlated by an ostensibly-secure 3rd party.
[20:36:56] <cabo> Web Auth Protocol WG is rightly being ignored :-)
[20:37:05] <cabo> Ah
[20:37:37] <Amelia Andersdotter> having some identifier could also potentially help with privacy infringements if for instance people's houses are filmed by stalkers.
[20:37:51] <ash> +1 Amelia
[20:38:19] <Mike StJohns> is there anything in the model that allows an unathenticated querier to get a token from the drone that can be handed off to say law enforcement who can then decrypt it or translate it into a specific identifier?
[20:38:22] <Eric Vyncke> Indeed a 2-way privacy...
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[20:38:33] <mcr> Mike, I think that this is specifically in-scope.
[20:39:21] <cabo> I love how Daniel ignores people who didn't log in properly :-)
[20:39:36] <Amelia Andersdotter> wouldn't it be more empowering if you could just ban some ids from flying in the vicinity of your wifi or so? like a tv-be-gone for drones or so.
[20:39:38] <ash> Flight ID should be enough for LE to get the drone ID, but the trouble is that if it's just a string that's broadcast, there's no authenticaiton with that. 20 something bytes is not enough to put a cryptographic signature in the payload.
[20:39:47] <ash> Attribution is hard, and signing can make it easier
[20:39:55] <Eric Vyncke> @Carsten: indeed, full real name would be useful
[20:40:06] <stewart@jabber.today> Full size does EVERYTHING in the public domain. Why should drones be an exception to this 100 year philosophy
[20:40:09] <ash> But without a signature, attribution could be prohibitively difficult
[20:40:24] <Eric Vyncke> @ash pretty much like the transponder mode-S ID...
[20:40:49] <mcr> ash, they actually get 4-5 20 byte packets.
[20:41:08] <ash> Ah, I was thinking htat it had to be in a single BT4 frame
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[20:42:41] <cabo> One problem we identified in the BOF is that the fragmentation is attackable
[20:42:55] <stewart@jabber.today> What happeens if there is no cell coverage at the place of operation?
[20:43:31] <rgmhtt> I will also point out that in N-RID, the GCS can have the Internet access and through the C2 connection to the UA, provide the needed N-RID messages.
[20:43:32] <ash> Yep. Kinda breaks the registration process for a globally-unique flight ID if you can't reach the global store
[20:43:41] <mcr> stewart, then your network-RID wouldn't work, and maybe you would not be allowed to fly? :-)
[20:43:43] <cabo> Who is "you"
[20:44:30] <rgmhtt> No Internet access is why Broadcast RID is valuable and why the RemoteID needs to be easily proved.
[20:44:45] <cabo> The drone has done it's job.  How is it supposed to know the LEO doesn't have adequate satellite phones with them.
[20:44:55] <mcr> was that SDaSilva?
[20:45:01] <cabo> Stephan Wenger
[20:46:51] Glen (AMS IT) joins the room
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[20:47:50] Glen (AMS IT) leaves the room
[20:49:41] <mcr> then we missed SDaSilva.
[20:49:52] <cabo> MCR is taking the role that we haven't identified yet: educating everyone (including the chair) how to do this :-)
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[20:55:12] <cabo> Authorization by registry membership is icky.
[20:55:32] <cabo> Like I'm a good guy because I have a Verisign cert.
[20:55:35] <Eric Vyncke> OTOH IP address reputation (spam & co) is done  per /24...
[20:55:38] <Eric Vyncke> or /64
[20:56:01] <keithmoore> cabo: agree.  (and LOL at the verisign ref)
[20:56:31] <mcr> but the converse might be true:  you are not an emergency responder if your cert came from Walmart.
[20:56:52] <keithmoore> Eric: just because people do it doesn't mean it's a good thing
[20:56:52] <jhoyla> You can design attribute based encryption schemes, that let you prove, for example, that you are a firefighter, or perhaps a registered pilot.
[20:57:08] <mcr> @jhoyla, agreed.
[20:57:11] <jhoyla> Without revealing anything more about your identity
[20:57:14] <cabo> It certainly provides great business opportunities for expensive, "high reputation" registries.
[20:57:21] <Eric Vyncke> @Keith: of course, my point was that we live in a world with similar bad examples
[20:57:30] <keithmoore> Eric: agree
[20:57:44] <cabo> Yeah, but we didn't design that, but hacked it after the fact
[20:58:31] <mcr> slide 6
[20:58:49] <mcr> brb. have to get sweater.
[21:00:26] <jhoyla> I'm not super keen on tree based auth, because it limits what properties you can have.
[21:00:36] <mcr> back.
[21:02:00] <jhoyla> Do we distinguish between operator properties and aircraft properties?
[21:02:01] <cabo> Stable IDs for aircrafts not good.
[21:02:12] <cabo> Good default for Walmart though.
[21:02:17] <mcr> I think that ID is stable for a given "flight"
[21:02:41] <mcr> I think it could be swapped around, if the aircraft supports it (broadcast-RID), or if network-RID.
[21:02:46] <cabo> That's what I was thinking, too, but I just heard different.
[21:03:08] <cabo> Flight IDs could be pre-registered on a sheet of 1000.
[21:03:24] <mcr> (see, that's why ISOC/PIR is selling .ORG, because UAS names are the next growth market.  Triple :-)
[21:03:40] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> A stable (static) ID for UA are being pushed back by Walmart - they don't want this as then their competitor (Amazon) could do data tracking of deliveries as an example
[21:04:01] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> But yes IDs are stable for a "flight"
[21:04:29] <cabo> The ID should not be attributable to Walmart (another reason I don't like semantically significant registries)
[21:05:09] <mcr> Walmart is the seller/retailer of the UAS, not that they are the operator of the UAS here.
[21:05:34] <cabo> Do you expect me to queue up at the DMV with my new drone?
[21:05:35] <ash> With enough collection time, I think that you can still get a pretty good picture of repetitive flight paths. Behavioral correlation against visual correlation (public webcams, for instance)
[21:06:16] <cabo> Anonymity requires intermediation
[21:06:18] <ash> I think that the privacy thread is going to be really, really hard to do in a way that's elegant and effective
[21:06:58] <ash> Agree, ID proxies will be required.
[21:08:19] <Amelia Andersdotter> having a dialogue with Data protection authorities will be very difficult before there are actual protocols...
[21:08:41] <Amelia Andersdotter> and there is quite terrible coordination between different over-sight authorities
[21:08:48] <ash> It sounds to me like ADS-B
[21:09:03] <jhoyla> Obviously, when all you have is a hammer everything looks like a nail, but PrivacyPass could solve all these problems (if not very efficiently)
[21:09:10] <ash> ^^ WRT speaker's statement about EU regs
[21:09:11] <rgmhtt> First, there is only limited privacy in the public airspace.  That said, the UA needs to be strongly IDed, but the rest of the UAS needs privacy protections.
[21:09:14] <Jari Arkko> Can you just replay a recorded broadcast message from UAV A in some other area? What would the impacts of such an attack be for the security of the system?
[21:09:22] <Amelia Andersdotter> what's ads-b?
[21:09:41] <cabo> Mode-S, the system commercial airplanes use
[21:09:47] <ash> ADS-B is how aircraft announce flight telemetry
[21:09:53] <Eric Vyncke> ADS-B is a way to communicate from plane to gound
[21:09:54] <rgmhtt> Real problem.  only the Auth message has the 64 bit timestamp,
[21:09:54] <Amelia Andersdotter> ah sry
[21:09:55] <jhoyla> I think you would have to sign your id and location with your private key.
[21:10:08] <jhoyla> Then spoofing would be harder.
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[21:10:23] <ash> Agree w/jhoyla. Signature on telemetry and timestamp
[21:10:23] <Eric Vyncke> ADS-B is also used to receive data from other planes
[21:10:30] <Amelia Andersdotter> it's very helpful to get three differently formulated replies :-) i feel particularly informed now.
[21:10:36] <rgmhtt> The message with the ID and the Lov/vec only have a sec with the current hour.  Open to replay.
[21:10:39] Olaf Kolkman joins the room
[21:10:47] <keithmoore> ads-b is lots of things but in this context basically a relatively new protocol used by aircraft transponders to transmit their IDs and positions.  it's used by ATC to track aircraft, but also by some other aircraft to detect conflicts.
[21:11:05] <ash> Also clock drift and acceptable thresholds, without an onboard RTC
[21:11:10] <cabo> Problems with ADS-B: Not authenticated, stable 24-bit ID that you even can look up
[21:11:20] <keithmoore> cabo: agree
[21:11:23] <cabo> Great for commercial flying, not so great for maker-driven drones
[21:11:28] <Adam W.  / Stu C.> Also note that Vector message is already filled - I have a section on this in my draft (to wrap and sign it)
[21:11:30] <ash> but if you can affort public key crypto, an RTC should be a small marginal expense :)
[21:11:31] <Amelia Andersdotter> but the response was good - having good standards for privacy helps privacy
[21:12:03] <Jari Arkko> @jhoyla — i guess that helps prevent copying of some victim UAV's message. But you can't really prove location, so you'd still be able to replay a message from a UAV that is co-operating with you in lying about the location. Not sure what the security impact would be but you'd be able to claim to be a different type of an UAV or an operator, for instance.
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[21:12:11] <cabo> ash: RTC is an operational expense (how do you manage to get it set)?
[21:12:16] <keithmoore> ash: cheap RTCs are notorious for having significant drift
[21:12:25] <ash> GPS, ostensibly
[21:12:47] <whatdafuq> pirates off the coast of Somalia do not practice that 100 year tradition
[21:12:54] <cabo> GPS also is too easy to attack.  Putting more incentive to do that is not great
[21:13:07] <ash> Agree
[21:13:21] <rgmhtt> If you put the System, and Loc/vec into the Auth message and include the sig we have developed, you can trust its claim.  Now if it really knows when about also where is a separate item.  The reason for adding CS-RID
[21:13:34] <Bernie Hoeneisen> Almost all the manned aircraft have a transponder (in Mode-S) sending  all kind of Identifiers (incl. tail-sign, aircraft-id, etc) in clear. Often a transponder is mandatory.
Therefore, I wonder whether we need to apply higher Privacy standards to UNmanned aircrafts.
[21:14:19] <Eric Vyncke> @Bernie +1
[21:14:26] <rgmhtt> Again the ID for the UA MUST be public.  No privacy on that.  Now WHO operates that UA is another issue.
[21:14:29] <Eric Vyncke> (for your first part)
[21:14:29] <ash> If the control equipment is trustworthy enough, create a secure method for having the controlunit manage the drone's internal RTC
[21:15:15] <rgmhtt> If C2 is bi-directional, the C2 can provide time, but loc/vec comes from the UA.
[21:15:20] <jhoyla> @Jari Arkko hmm, I think it depends if the operator is being authed or the drone.
[21:15:51] <mcr> ash, if the control equipement is locked down... then no innovation?
[21:16:34] <ash> No, just mean secured WRT good design that doesn't have to be as lightweight as the equipment that goes into the drone
[21:16:39] <cabo> There is no problem with ID being public.  There is a problem with unauthorized linkability
[21:17:24] <jhoyla> Imagine someone is using a drone to look through people's windows. They are at risk of vigilante action from the snoopee.
[21:17:36] <ash> TLS, if the hardware supports it, and a good RTC and upstream update method(cellular, GPS, NTP) in the control unit.
[21:17:59] <jhoyla> Just because some group of operators act honestly and don't care about their privacy does not mean that everyone else is the same.
[21:18:07] <rgmhtt> Agreed Cabo, I think I have covered the linkablity problem.
[21:19:05] <rgmhtt> See Appendix A of my CS-RID draft.  I am getting information on how we can learn about non-RID players and identify them.
[21:20:23] <cabo> 33 in jabber, 36 in Etherpad, 60 in Etherpad Bluesheet, 72 in call.
[21:21:24] <Eric Vyncke> Indeed, please put your name on the bluesheet https://etherpad.ietf.org:9009/p/notes-ietf-107-drip?useMonospaceFont=true this is optional but it helps
[21:22:32] <mcr> also, I didn't get Toerless' comments, but he's not on jabber, correct.
[21:23:27] <mcr> Adam, the jabber is logged, yes!  
[21:23:34] <Amelia Andersdotter> +1 cabo actually
[21:23:40] <Amelia Andersdotter> on unauthorized linkability
[21:24:24] <Jari Arkko> @cabo agree about unauthorized linkability. Also, unauthorized access to PII and other information based on just having the IDs. I mean the group has said that there shall be control on who gets what information, but I think we've spent too little time in figuring out what the requirements for that are in detail.
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[21:25:36] <jhoyla> Going back to the PrivacyPass thing, imagine when I register my drone I can acquire a number of pre-authed tokens from my registry. I can then broadcast a different one each flight, and they are all unlinkable.
[21:26:20] <mcr> unlinkable to random people, which is good, but linkable via court order to registrar, which I think is appropriate.
[21:26:42] <mcr> who was speaking, that the IETF is too slow?
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[21:27:12] <jhoyla> PrivacyPass leaks exactly one bit, which gives us some control of the privacy properties.
[21:29:01] <Amelia Andersdotter> ok that's everyone being oddly self-deprecating - it matches the EU very well!
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[21:32:00] <rgmhtt> HHIT leaks which registry.  Based on my understanding of the airspace privacy, that is the right amount.
[21:32:12] <keithmoore> the idea of getting early consensus on requirements is unworkable - partly because people don't understand the implications until the work is considered complete, and partly because the wider IETF community won't pay much attention until Last Call.  (yes, the latter is a general problem with IETF, but the former is a fundamental problem with the waterfall model)
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[21:33:11] <jhoyla> Some of us are stuck at home with nothing better to do than review IETF drafts :P
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[21:35:54] <jhoyla> On their own recognisance, if you will.
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[22:13:50] <mijarven> there was a bit outdated info on a slide 10/14 related to EASA
[22:15:12] <mijarven> Here still 1.5 week old New U-space regulation draft
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions/opinion-012020
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